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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-MARITIME WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION-A MARTIME
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION FOR UNSEAWORTHINESS ALLEGING Loss OF
SUPPORT, SERVICES, SOCIETY AND FUNERAL EXPENSES IS NOT BARRED
BY DECEDENT'S RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES DURING HIS LIFETIME

Prior to his death, respondent's husband brought suit under
general maritime law, alleging unseaworthiness,' and recovered for
past and future wages, pain and suffering, and medical and incidental expenses resulting from injuries received on board petitioner's vessel 2 in Louisiana's navigable waters. After her husband's death, respondent filed a maritime wrongful death action
based on unseaworthiness to recover damages for loss of support,
services, society and funeral expenses. Petitioner contended that
this suit constituted an attempt to relitigate the same causes of
action in order to recover twice for the same injuries and was,
therefore, barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Obversely, respondent argued that her right to recover damages was based upon
new causes of action that had not accrued during her husband's
life and consequently were not barred. The District Court dismissed respondent's suit on grounds of res judicata and failure to
state a claim.3 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. On
Writ of Certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, held affirmed. A maritime wrongful death action for unseaworthiness alleging loss of support, services, society and funeral expenses is not
barred by decedent's recovery of damages for personal injuries during his lifetime. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 94 S. Ct. 806
(1974).
1. "Seaworthiness" has been defined as the "absolute nondelegable duty of a
shipowner to provide ... a vessel 'sufficient in all respects for the trade in which
it is employed'. . . and to prevent ... injury to seamen by any part of the vessel
or equipment used in the ordinary course of their employment." Moragne v. State
Marine Lines, Inc., 211 So.2d 161, 163 (Fla. 1968), aff'd, 398 U.S. 375 (1970). As
Gilnore and Black suggested in their treatise "the unseaworthiness doctrine has
become the principal vehicle for personal injury recovery." G. GILMORE & C.
BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY §§ 6-38 (1957).
2. Respondent's husband was a longshoreman working on board petitioner's
vessel.
3. The ruling that all of the claims were barred by the doctrine ofresjudicata
left the respondent without a claim in the district court.
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Until Moragne v. States Marine Lines4 was decided in 1970,
maritime law governing wrongful death was a confusing morass
often yielding vastly different results in similar factual situations.
The early American precedents generally permitted survivors to
sue for wrongful death under general maritime law But in 1886,
the United States Supreme Court announced in The Harrisburg'
that the American courts had misread the English precedent 7 and
refused to permit further wrongful death actions unless the state
in which the accident occurred provided a statutory remedy. Suits
for nonfatal personal injuries, however, continued to be cognizable
under general maritime law.' In 1920, recognizing the need for a
more adequate wrongful death remedy, Congress enacted the
4. 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (claim by wife based on unseaworthiness for wrongful
death of decedent longshoreman in state waters).
5. In The E.B. Ward, Jr., 17 F. 456, 457 (C.C.E.D. La. 1833), the court characterized the wrongful death decisions prior to 1833 according to the following
approaches: "(1) that the action does survive; (2) that it does not survive; (3) that
when the tort resulting in death was committed on navigable waters within the
body of a country where the prevailing state law gave a right of action, the
admiralty court would allow the action and enforce the remedy by a proceeding
in rem." It is certain, however, that a majority of the cases permitted recovery.
The Columbia, 27 F. 704 (S.D.N.Y. 1886) (pilot boat run down and sunk by
steamship attempting to receive pilot); Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas.
:386 (No. 6,625) (D. Md. 1879) (death of minor son following collision between
parent's sailing yacht and steamer).
6. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
7. As the Court noted in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 389 U.S. 375, 37988, the old common law prohibition against recovery was based on the "felonymerger" doctrine which held that the civil action of the decedent's beneficiaries
was merged into or preempted by the felony, which was an offense against the
crown and the more serious of the two. The felon was punished by death, and his
property was forfeited to the crown leaving nothing for the plaintiffs in the civil
action. Several earlier American decisions recognized that this basis for the rule
made it inapplicable in the United States. See The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 (No.
12,578) (C.C.D. Md. 1865) (death of wife resulting from collision of two steamers);
Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 894 (No. 11,234) (D.C. Me. 1825) (death of minor
son while serving as cabin boy caused by beating inflicted by first mate, dismissed
on other grounds). For an excellent discussion of the development of admiralty
law prior to Moragne, see J. George & C. Moore, Wrongful Death and Survival
Actions Under the General Maritime Law: Pre-Harrisburg through PostMoragne, 4 J. MARITIME L. & CoM. 1 (1972-73).
8. Atlantic Transport Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914).
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Death on the High Seas Act' and the Jones Act.10 The Death on
the High Seas Act (DOHSA) gave a remedy for deaths occurring
as a result of negligence and unseaworthiness beyond the threemile limit; the Jones Act provided a remedy for seamen who were
killed or injured as a result of their employer's negligence both on
water and on land. But the Jones Act provided no remedy for
unseaworthiness. In the years after these statutes became law,
unseaworthiness became the functional equivalent of strict liability and the primary basis of recovery under DOHSA and in state
law actions in those states that recognized the doctrine. The Tungus v. Skovgaard" required admiralty courts to apply the state
wrongful death law as an integrated whole with all its breadth and
limitations. Consequently, if a fatal injury occurred on the navigable waters of a state whose wrongful death statute did not recognize unseaworthiness, an admiralty court sitting in that jurisdiction was obliged to apply a nonmaritime standard of liability in the
case. Further complications arose in 1964, when the Supreme
Court held in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp. 2 that the
Jones Act was the exclusive remedy for seamen killed in state
waters. Thus, a patchwork of rights and remedies attached or
failed to attach depending upon the anomalous circumstances of
whether one was a seaman, whether the accident occurred within
state waters and, if so, whether that state had an unseaworthiness
9. The Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (1966) was initially
enacted in 1920. The Act gives to the personal representative of any person whose
death was caused by wrongful act, neglect, or default, more than one marine
league from shore, an action in admiralty for the benefit of the decedent's wife or
husband, parent, child or dependent relative. The action must be brought within
two years from the date the cause of action arose. Contributory negligence of the
decedent does not bar recovery but mitigates damages. Unseaworthiness actions
are permitted under this Act.
10. Merchant Marine Act (Jones Act), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). This Act, also
initially adopted in 1920, incorporates by reference the provisions of the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (F.E.L.A.), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1966). The Jones Act
gives the personal representative of a crew member the right to maintain a wrongful death action within three years from the day the cause of action accrued for
the benefit of the surviving widow or husband and children; if none, for the
employee's parents; if none, for the next of kin. Contributory negligence is not a
bar to recovery but a mitigating factor.
11. 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
12. 379 U.S. 148 (1964) (action by mother and dependent children for wrongful death of seaman killed in state waters).
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remedy.': Moragne v. States Marine Lines sought to untangle the
thicket in one stroke by overruling The Harrisburgand creating a
wrongful death remedy for unseaworthiness under general maritime law in order to restore uniformity to federal admiralty law in
a manner consistent with the current public policy of permitting
recovery in wrongful death situations. Although cognizant that
Moragne would produce new problems, the Court expressly relegated the task of finding solutions to the lower federal courts, but
advised them to look for persuasive analogies in the state and
federal wrongful death statutes and case law. 4 Left unresolved
were questions relating to beneficiaries, time limitations on actions, vitality of state wrongful death remedies, damages, and the
effect of recovery in a prior personal injury action. Regarding the
last issue-the effect of a victim's personal injury action on a survivor's later action for wrongful death-most wrongful death statutes have employed terms substantially identical to the provisions
13. Three discrepancies produced by The Harrisburgline of cases have been
identified. (1) "[W]ithin territorial waters, identical conduct violating federal
law (here the furnishing of an unseaworthy vessel) produces liability if the victim
is merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed. [(2)] [I]dentical breaches
of the duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in death, produce liability
outside the three mile limit-since a claim under the Death on the High Seas Act
may be founded on unseaworthiness, see Kernan v. American Dredging Co. 355
U.S. 426, 430 n.4 (1958)-but not within the territorial waters of a state whose
local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims. [(3)] The third, and essentially
the 'strangest anomaly is that a true seaman-that is, a member of a ship's
company, covered by the Jones Act-is provided no remedy for death caused by
unseaworthiness within territorial waters while a longshoreman, to whom the
duty of seaworthiness was extended only because he performs work traditionally
done by seamen, does have such a remedy when allowed by state statute." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, at 395-96.
14. In effect, the Court directed the lower courts to employ their inherent
power to create federal common law in these cases. See Maier, Coordinationof
Laws in a National Federal State: An Analysis of the Writings of Elliott Evans
Cheatham, 26 VAND. L. REv. 209, 225-26 (1973).

Specifically, the Court advised that with respect to "particular questions of the
measure of damages, the courts will not be without persuasive analogy for guidance. Both the Death on the High Seas Act and the numerous state wrongfuldeath acts have been implemented with success for decades. The experience thus
built up counsels that a suit for wrongful death raises no problems unlike those
that have long been grist for the judicial mill." Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
398 U.S. at 408. See also 1 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 151 (1970-71); 24 ARK. L. REV.

526 (1971); 17 N.Y. L.F. 304 (1971); 4 J. MARITIME L. 1 (1972-73).
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in Lord Campbell's Act,'5 which initially created the remedy. The
vast majority of the state cases construing this language have held
that a recovery for injuries during the victim's life conclusively
bars a second recovery for the same injury."8 Similarly, in Michigan
Central Railroad Company v. Vreeland, 7 the Supreme Court
found the wrongful death provision of the Federal Employee's Liability Act, later incorporated into the Jones Act, to be "essentially
identical with" Lord Campbell's Act. Therefore when the Court
faced the question of a second recovery in Mellon v. Goodyear,",it
held that recovery was barred by the victim's settlement of his
personal injury action during his lifetime. However, there are state
cases that have permitted a second recovery." Also, DOHSA could
15. Lord Campbell's Act, St. 9 and 10 Vict. c. 93, An Act for compensating
the Families of Persons killed by Accidents. (Aug. 26, 1846) "Whereas no Action
at Law is now maintainable against a Person who by his wrongful Act, Neglect,
or Default may have caused the Death of another Person . . .: Be it therefore
enacted ... That whensoever the Death of a Person shall be caused by wrongful

Act, Neglect, or Default, and the Act, Neglect, or Default is such as would (if
Death had not ensued) have entitled the Party injured to maintain an Action and
recover Damages in respect thereof, then and in every such Case the Person who
would have been liable if Death had not ensued shall be liable to an Action for
Damages, notwithstanding the Death of the Person injured, and although the
Death shall have been caused under such Circumstances as to amount in Law to
Felony.
II. And be it enacted, That every such Action shall be for the Benefit of the
Wife, Husband, Parent, and Child of the Person whose Death shall have been so
caused, and shall be brought by and in the Name of the Executor or Administrator of the Person deceased; and in every such Action the Jury may give such
Damages as they may think proportioned to the Injury resulting from such Death
to the Parties respectively for whom and for whose Benefit such Action shall be
brought ....

III. Provided always, and be it enacted, That not more than One Action shall
lie for and in respect of the same Subject Matter of complaint; . . ."
16. S.SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (Supp. 1972).
17. 227 U.S. 59, 70 (1913).
18. 277 U.S. 335 (1928) (action by wife and children under FELA for wrongful
death of railroad employee who had previously executed full settlement and release).
19. Rowe v. Richards, 35 S.D. 201,151 N.W. 1001 (1915) (claim by widow and
surviving child for wrongful death of decedent after decedent had executed a full
release). There, the court declared "[w]e must confess our inability to grasp the
logic of any so called reasoning through which the conclusion is drawn that the
husband simply because he may live to suffer from a physical injury and thus
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conceivably be read to permit a second recovery, 2 but the question
has never been decided. Generally, then, a second recovery is not
permitted under either federal or state law. The issue of damages
awardable under federal and state wrongful death statutes is more
variegated. The measure of damages awardable under most state
2' the Jones Act and DOHSA is the survivors' pecuniary
statutes,
loss. 22 Pecuniary loss generally includes four elements: (1) the support the decedent would have provided during his lifetime to the
beneficiary, 23 (2) loss of services the decedent would have provided
to the beneficiary, 24 (3) deprivation of parental nurture and guid25
ance that the deceased parent would have given his minor child
and (4) loss of inheritable estate. 2 Thus while loss of support and
services are clearly compensable under both state and federal law,
the elements of loss of society, 27 survivors' grief and funeral expenbecome vested with a cause of action for the violation of his own personal right
has an implied power to release a cause of action-one which has not then accrued; one which may never accrue; one which from its very nature cannot accrue
until his death; and one which if it ever does accrue will accrue, in favor of his
wife and be based solely upon the violation of a right vested solely in the wife."
35 S.D. at 215, 151 N.W. at 1006.
20. The character of admiralty relief should be guided by the principle that
"certainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in
admiralty to give rather than to withhold the remedy, when not required to
withhold it by established and inflexible rules." The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910
(No. 17, 578) (C.C.D. Md. 1865). DOHSA does not expressly restrict the plaintiff
to one action for each injury, and DOHSA is the only federal statute "that deals
specifically and exclusively with actions for wrongful death

. . .

for breaches of

duties imposed by maritime law." Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. at
407. Thus, it could be argued that no "established and inflexible rules" would
preclude a second recovery.
21. See S. SPEISER, supra note 16, at § 3.1.
22. DOHSA limits recovery to "a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary
loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought

....

"

46

U.S.C. § 762 (1970).
23. Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964) (death of passenger in airplane that crashed on the high seas); Petition of Marina Mercante
Nicaraguense, S.A., 248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
24. Sabine Towing Co., Inc. v. Brennan, 85 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1936) (action
for death of crewman of tug that floundered due to unseaworthiness).
25. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961).
26. National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959).
27. The term "society" is generally used in connection with the marriage
partner's right to enjoyment of the spouse's capacity for usefulness, aid, and
Vol. 7-No. 3
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ses are much less certain. Except for one early aberration,"8 the preMoragne decisions in the federal courts refused to award damages
for loss of society on the theory that society was never thought to
be capable of pecuniary valuation under DOHSA or the Jones
Act. 2 The federal cases litigated since Moragne have also refused
to permit recovery for loss of society. " In contrast, a majority of
the states, either expressly or by judicial construction, now afford
recovery for loss of society.3 ' Recovery for survivors' grief has generally been disallowed under DOHSA and the Jones Act, as well as
under general maritime law,32 although this item is recoverable
under some state statutes. Funeral expenses have been regarded
more favorably by the courts. Although DOHSA and the Jones Act
comfort. The term generally encompasses sexual relations and is often used synonimously with the term "consortium." SQEE Doe v. Doe, 59 Tenn. App. 108, 438
S.W.2d 353 (1968); Furnish v. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co., 102 Mo. 669, 15 S.W. 315
(1891).
28. The E.B. Ward, Jr., 23 F. 900 (C.C.E.D. La. 1885).
29. Igneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963);
Middleton v. Luckenbach, S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1934); Dugas v. National
Aircraft Corp., 310 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
30. Simpson v. Knutsen, 444 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1971); Petition of United
States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970); Green v. Ross, 338 F. Supp. 365
(S.D. Fla. 1972).
31. Of the 44 states that measure damages by the loss sustained by the beneficiaries, 27 permit recovery for loss of society. Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, New
Mexico, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Utah, Virginia, and Washington have
equivocal statutes, which have been construed by their courts as including recovery for loss of society. The wrongful death statutes of California, Delaware, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Pennsylvania, Texas, and the Virgin Islands, which
either expressly or by judicial construction limit recovery to pecuniary losses,
have been judicially construed to permit recovery for the pecuniary value of the
decedent's society. See S. SPEISER, supra note 16, § 3.42, at 209-219.
32. S. SPEISER, supra note 16, § 3.45 at 222. The earlier admiralty cases also
allowed nothing for "the grief of surviving relatives or a solace for bereavement."
Hollyday v. The David Reeves, 12 F. Cas. 386-88 (No. 6,625) (D.C. Md. 1879).
Many state courts have also taken this view, but there now appears to be a
tendency to permit recovery for such damages. See S. SPEISER, supra note 16,
§§ 3.45-3.46. One recent decision construing Moragne, In Re Sincere Navigation
Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971), expressly permits recovery for survivor's
grief noting that the trend in recent years in the common law states, as well as
scholarly opinion, supported such recoveries. The Fifth Circuit has refused to
permit recovery for survivor's grief commenting that "the current rationales underlying recoverability for survivor's grief damages in state death actions are too
divergent and ill defined to override the policies against recoverability manifested
Summer, 1974
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do not permit recovery, :"' federal courts prior to The Harrisburg
and after Moragne, as well as a majority of the state courts, have
awarded damages for funeral expenses."
In the instant case the Court confronted the question of the res
judicata effect of a prior personal injury judgment on a general
maritime wrongful death action by declaring forthrightly that the
state and federal precedents were essentially inapplicable since
each was constrained by statutory limitations. Since the wrongful
death remedy created by Moragne is not a statutory construct, the
Court found itself free to evaluate the validity of the respondent's
action without regard to state or federal precedent. 3" Thus emancipated from precedent, the Court found the doctrine of resjudicata
inapplicable to these facts. " The decedent's suit was confined to
recovery for his own loss of wages, pain and suffering, medical and
incidental expenses. On the other hand, the suit brought by his
wife sought recovery for her loss of support, services and society
and for funeral expenses, and, consequently, was predicated on a
in general maritime law and in the federal statutes." Petition of MNV Elaine
,Jones, 480 F.2d 11, 33 (5th Cir. 1973). The latest reported decision on the question
reaffirms that approach. Hueschen v. Flour Ocean Services, Inc., 483 F.2d 1396
(5th Cir. 1973) (action for death of son killed instantly while standing on barge).
33. Under these acts, funeral expenses are considered expenses of the estate
of the deceased rather than a pecuniary loss to the beneficiaries. See Cities Service Oil Co. v. Launey, 403 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1968) (action by widow under Jones
Act for wrongful death of seaman). But see Moore v. The O/S Fram, 226 F. Supp.
816 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (Jones Act and DOHSA action by common-law wife, children and mother for drowning of shrimp crawler master); and Farmer v. The O/S
Fluffy D, 220 F. Supp. 917 (S.D. Tex. 1963) (action for stabbing death of captain
of shrimp boat under Jones Act and DOHSA-recovery permitted under the
concept that the beneficiaries were ultimately responsible for payment of funeral
expenses).
34. See S. SPEISER, supra note 16, at § 3.49.
35. 94 S.Ct. at 812.
36. Commenting on the state and federal cases barring the subsequent wrongful death action the court said "the bar does not appear to rest in those cases so
much upon principles of res judicata or public policy as upon statutory limitations on the wrongful death action. As one authority has noted, '[t]he fact that
all civil remedies for wrongful death derive from statute has important consequences. Since the right was unknown to common law, the legislatures which
created the right were free to impose restrictions upon it.' 2 F. Harper & F. James,
The Law of Torts § 24.2, p. 1285 (1956)." 94 S. Ct. at 812.
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separate and unique cause of action. Referring to Cromwell v.
County of Sac, 37 the Court pointed out that the doctrine of res
judicataapplies only to causes of action that have been previously
litigated. Since none of the causes of action in the second suit had
been litigated, the doctrine of res judicata does not apply. While
discounting the likelihood of a double recovery by the plaintiff, the
Court did observe an "apparent overlap" between the decedent's
recovery for loss of future wages and the dependent's claim for
support. Recognizing that under traditional notions of collateral
estoppe 3 1s non-parties in the first action are generally not bound in
a second action, the Court proceeded to carve out an exception to
this general rule by treating the decedent-claimant in the suit for
personal injuries as a fiduciary representing the interests of his
beneficiaries.3 1 Consequently, survivors, as beneficiaries, would be
collaterally estopped from later litigating their loss of support if
the decedent had litigated the question of future wages in the first
action. This reasoning, the Court explained, preserves the integrity
of the doctrine of collateral estoppel since the decedent's beneficiaries would be constructive parties in the first action. After concluding that the second lawsuit could be maintained, the Court
considered the question of damages. Noting preliminarily that recovery for support and services is permitted in the vast majority
of the state and federal wrongful death actions,4 the Court reasoned that the recovery for loss of society is not inconsistent with
37. 94 U.S. 351 (1876).
38. See Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation,
402 U.S. 313, 320-27 (1971).
39. The Court cites to an article and a note which lend support to that approach: Vesta, Preclusion/Res Judicata Variables, 50 IowA L. REV. 27, 63-64
(1964), which suggests that the second action would be barred since it was "derivative" of the first suit. The note, Developments in the Law of Res Judicata,65
HARV. L. REV. 818, 855-56 (1952), suggests that the party on whose account the
action is brought is the real party in interest and is therefore bound by the action
commenced by his fiduciary. Whether an injured party's wife or children could
be presumed to be the parties on whose account an action for loss of future wages
is brought is questionable in view of the lack of decided cases reaching the question. The court's approach is bolstered somewhat by the RESTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS, § 92 (1942), which deals expressly with wrongful death actions and
provides that "the rules of resjudicataapply in actions brought after death as to
issues in an action brought by him (the decedent) and terminating in a judgment
before his death."
40. See notes 20 and 21 supra.
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the guidance given in Moragne to look to DOHSA, the Jones Act
and the state statutes for persuasive analogies. Although the federal statutes disallow a survivor's recovery for loss of society,4' the
Court identified a clear majority of the states that have rejected
the federal approach and expanded their damage remedies to include loss of services.12 The Court noted further that the trend was
unmistakeably in favor of permitting recovery for loss of services.':
Furthermore, the Court reflected, its decision to align general maritime law with state law on this point rather than the federal
admiralty analogies was compelled by the humanitarian policy of
maritime law to show "special solicitude" for injuries occurring
within its jurisdiction.44 The Court had little difficulty with allowing the recovery of funeral expenses on the grounds that the preHarrisburgdecisions and post-Moragne decisions, as well as a majority of the states, permitted recovery for these items. Consequently, a maritime wrongful death action for unseaworthiness
alleging loss of support, services, society and funeral expenses is
not barred by decedent's recovery of damages for personal injuries.
during his lifetime.
The dissent, led by Mr. Justice Powell, objected to this expansion of admiralty law as an unwarranted violation of the principle
of stare decisis, which would generate confusion in application and
frequently result in duplicative recoveries. The dissent maintained
that a recovery by a beneficiary of a decedent who had previously
recovered during his lifetime extended a cause of action to plaintiffs suing under the general maritime law that other plaintiffs
suing under DOHSA or the Jones Act would not have. Further, the
dissent contended that the majority's extension of damages to
allow recovery for loss of society is inconsistent with the congressional directive expressed in DOHSA and the Jones Act that recovery be limited to pecuniary losses. Both of these extensions, the
dissent insisted, are violative of the policy expressed in Moragne
that subsequent decisions under the general maritime law should
achieve results that are consistent with results that would be
achieved under the federal and state statutory remedies. Further,
41.
42.
43.
44.

See notes 28 and 29 supra.
See note 30 supra.
Id.
See 94 S. Ct. at 811.
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the dissent argued that the collateral estoppel device constructed
by the majority to prevent duplicative recovery will not adequately
prevent a sympathetic jury from generously awarding damages in
the wrongful death action when the damage cannot be objectively
ascertained. This presents a particular problem to the defendant,
Justice Powell suggested, since an unseaworthiness action is essentially one of strict liability historically limiting damages to pecuniary losses. Additionally, the dissent pointed out that the defendant
would be deprived of the comfort of knowing that the action had
been conclusively resolved and that additional expenditures for
litigation would not be required at some later time.
The Court's opinion in the instant case conclusively resolved the
res judicata question and the damage questions relating to loss of
society and funeral expenses, both of which were left unresolved
in Moragne. Rather than merely synthesize solutions to these questions from convenient legal analogies, the Court chose to venture
into uncharted waters and, in doing so, broadened the scope of the
maritime death action at the expense of the uniformity that
Moragne sought to achieve.15 This result puts general maritime law
at odds with the recovery permitted under the Jones Act. The
dissent suggests the possibility that the beneficiaries of a seaman
injured on land could not maintain a second action pursuant to the
Jones Act remedy while the beneficiaries of a seaman injured on
the water would be permitted such an action under general maritime law. " The need to avoid such fortuitous results was a compelling consideration in Moragne. The willingness of the majority to
expand recovery was viewed by the dissent as portending an overruling of the Mellon line of cases and thereby effecting a similar
expansion under DOHSA, the Jones Act, and its predecessor, the
Federal Employee's Liability Act. This kind of expansion, however, entails several risks. As the dissent cogently observes, judicial
supervision cannot effectively prevent a sympathetic jury from
giving the plaintiff a double recovery. Further, the majority's position on res judicata will likely encourage survivors to sue after the
45.

One of the justifications for the Moragne decision was the need to "assure

uniform vindication of federal policies .

. . ."

398 U.S. at 401.

46. The dissent here impliedly suggests that Moragne was remedial in character providing a cause of action for unseaworthiness only when the action was
previously barred rather than offering an alternative remedy to the sailor's beneficiaries. 94 S. Ct. at 820.
Summer, 1974
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compensated victim has died, and thus cause the defendant to
incur additional litigation expense and, in every case, deny him the
comfort of knowing that his liability has been conclusively adjudicated. The same uniformity problem is created by the Court's
willingness to permit recovery for loss of society. Although consistent with the majority of the state courts, the general maritime law
now goes significantly further than Congress provided in the statutory wrongful death remedies,4 7 suggesting again the possibility of
disparate treatment in similar circumstances. The dissent believes
that this development will discourage the use of federal statutory
remedies. Actions under DOHSA will certainly be diminished, but
it can hardly be said that this decision will discourage use of the
Jones Act since most lawsuits involving the death of a seaman were
brought under the general maritime law even before this decision
came down. Indeed, the result that the dissent fears is inherent in
the meaning of the Moragne decision, which created a new nonstatutory cause of action. It is too late to lament the loss of DOHSA
and the Jones Act. Moreover, the augmented recovery afforded
plaintiffs by this decision is more consistent with the humanitarian
character of admiralty than the less generous alternatives open to
the Court. The federal statutory remedies have long been regarded
by many as poorly written, stopgap measures that offered an outdated remedy and spawned useless litigation. While the decision
leaves unanswered the questions of recovery for survivors' grief,
appropriate beneficiaries, time limitations and the viability of
state wrongful death statutes, the majority opinion clearly defines
a posture favoring a broadening of the maritime wrongful death
remedy at the expense of the uniformity born of statutory
interpretation. This implies, perhaps, that the humanitarian character of the result may be of greater consequence than precedent
in determining the outcome of future cases.
Stanley D. Miller

47. See note 28 supra.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND
SEIZURE-WITHOUT CONSENT, WARRANT OR PROBABLE CAUSE, A RovING PATROL SEARCH OF A VEHICLE TWENTY-FIVE MILES FROM BORDER
IS AN UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE WITHIN MEANING OF
FOURTH AMENDMENT

Petitioner' was stopped twenty-five miles north of the Mexican
border by officers of the Immigration and Nationalization Service
who searched his car for aliens unlawfully in the country.' The
search disclosed a large quantity of marijuana, and petitioner was
convicted in district court of knowingly receiving, concealing and
facilitating the transportation and concealment of illegally imported marijuana.3 Petitioner appealed, alleging that the roving
patrol search, twenty-five miles from the border and without consent, warrant or probable cause, was in violation of the fourth
amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.4 The government argued that the search was reasonable
considering the circumstances involved in an extended border
search and the authority granted the immigration service under
section 287(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act' and 8
1. Condrado Almeida-Sanchez, a Mexican citizen with a valid United States
work permit.
2. Because of the difficulty in deterring the influx of Mexican aliens in the
immediate vicinity of the border, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) has established permanent and periodic checkpoints and roving patrols in
areas removed from the border. Checkpoint and roving patrol searches, loosely
termed "extended border searches," are designed to intercept aliens illegally
within the country before they become lost in anonymity in the large urban areas
further removed from the border. The officers who apprehended AlmeidaSanchez were conducting a roving patrol. The officers' search of the vehicle,
without a warrant or probable cause, included the area between the back seat and
the trunk because of an official INS bulletin that indicated that aliens were being
illegally transported concealed behind the backseats of vehicles.
3. 21 U.S.C. § 176(a) (1964) (statute dealing with the illegal importation and
transportation of narcotics).
4. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5. "Any officer or employee of the [Immigration and Naturalization] Service
authorized under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General shall have power
without warrant . . .
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C.F.R. § 287.1.6 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the conviction solely on the basis of Section 1357 of the Act.7
On writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court, held,
reversed. Without consent, warrant or probable cause, a roving
patrol search of a vehicle twenty-five miles from the border is an
unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266
(1973).
The fourth amendment guarantees freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures;" the Supreme Court has held that, as a
general rule, the search will not be reasonable without a search
warrant issued pursuant to a determination of probable cause by
a magistrate. Only in extraordinary circumstances will the Court
allow exceptions to this rule.' For each exception the courts have
found a predominant government interest that, at least to a limited extent, outweighs the Constitutional guarantee. Thus, in
Carroll v. United States,'0 the Supreme Court held that because
of the inherent mobility of an automobile, an auto search without
warrant is reasonable in terms of the fourth amendment. However,
the search is reasonable only if there is valid probable cause to
believe that the automobile contains "that which by law is subject
to seizure."" The Court has also authorized municipal administrative searches for housing-code violations pursuant to an "area warrant" based on the municipal authority's appraisal of conditions
in the area as a whole, rather than its knowledge of conditions in
each particular building. 12 Moreover, the Court has held that war(3) within a reasonable distance from any external boundary of the United States,
to board and search for aliens any vessel within the territorial waters of the United
States and any railway car, aircraft, conveyance, or vehicle ...

."

Immigration

and Nationality Act § 287; 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a) (1970) [hereinafter cited as the

Act].
6. "Reasonable Distance. The term 'reasonable distance,' as used in section
287(a)(3) of the Act, means within 100 air miles from any external boundary of
the United States . . . 2" Attorney General's Regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 287.1(a)(2)
(1970) [hereinafter cited as the Regulation].
7. United States v. Almeida-Sanchez, 452 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1971).
8. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
9. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970).
10. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
11. 267 U.S. at 149.
12. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967). As it affects the
individual homeowner, the decision significantly diluted the requirement for
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rantless searches of pervasively regulated, federally licensed
businesses are not unreasonable and constitute only a limited intrusion on the licensee's reasonable expectation of privacy. 3 Additionally, it has been long recognized that the guarantees of the
fourth amendment do not apply to customs searches.' 4 And in
1917, the power to search without probable cause or warrant was
extended to officers of the Immigration and Nationalization Service to assist in their attempt to discover aliens illegally seeking
entry into the country.' 5 Since 1946, immigration officials have
been authorized by Congress to search without probable cause or
warrant within a reasonable distance from any United States border or external boundary.' 6 Consequently, the courts have held
consistently that the immigration service has absolute authority-without warrant or probable cause-to search for aliens in any
type of vehicle within 100 miles of the border.'" This authority to
search is exercised at border entry points, permanent and periodic
checkpoints on major roads leading from the border, and by roving
patrols checking the more infrequently used back roads in the
border area. Although conducted solely for the detection of aliens
illegally entering or within the country, immigration searches frequently disclose "plain view" evidence of another crime or give the
inspecting officer probable cause to believe that another crime is
being committed; the officer then is empowered to conduct an even
more thorough search of the vehicle.' 8 Typically, the evidence disprobable cause. The Court conditioned the issuance of area warrants on (1) a long
history of judicial and public acceptance of this type search, (2) the public interest protected by such searches and (3) the limited intrusion on individual privacy
occasioned by administrative or inspective searches. 387 U.S. at 537; see, See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (Camara applied to commercial structures).
13. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (search of a business licensed
to sell firearms); Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970)
(search of a liquor distributorship).
14.

"[E]very [customs official] . . . shall have full power and authority, to

enter any ship or vessel, in which they shall have reason to suspect any goods,
wares or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search
for, seize, and secure any such goods ...

"

Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, 1 Stat.

29, 43 (1789).
15. Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 16, 39 Stat. 874, 886 (1917).
16. The Act, supra note 5; the Regulation, supra note 6.
17. See generally, Gordon, Powers and Responsibilities of Immigration
Officers, 59 A.B.A.J. 64 (1973).
18. Border patrol officers wear two hats, serving as specially appointed cusSummer, 1974

RECENT DECISIONS

covered is narcotics and the defendant is prosecuted under federal
narcotic statutes. "9 In the Ninth Circuit, " the leading such case is
Fernandez v. United States." Fernandez, an alien, was stopped by
immigration officials at a permanent checkpoint approximately 60
miles north of the Mexican border. Marijuana was discovered 22 and
Fernandez was convicted of smuggling and transporting narcotics.
On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of the search and
the Act and Regulation2 3 under which the search was conducted.
The court determined that the Act represented congressional recognition of the nation's right to protect its own boundaries and
called it "clearly constitutional. ' 24 The Regulation was held reasonable in light of all the circumstances. 25 Moreover, the thorough
search was sustained on the grounds that valid probable cause
arose from the detection of the marijuana-like odor.26 In Fumagalli
v. United States,27 even though the defendant's car was thoroughly
toms officials in addition to being officers of the Immigration and Nationalization
Service. Under the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1401(i) (1970), Congress empowered the Secretary of the Treasury to make these special appointments; the
Secretary further delegated the power to the Bureau of Customs to designate the
border patrol officers as "acting Custom Patrol officers." T.D. 53654, 89 Treas.
Dec. 334 (1954); see, United States v. Thompson, 475 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. McDaniel, 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972).
19. Customs searches on or near the border the sole purpose of which is the
discovery of illegal narcotics are excluded from this discussion, but it should be
noted that, depending on the court involved, differing standards of the reasonableness of the search apply.
20. Because of the proximity to the Mexican border, the majority of narcotics
violations discovered by immigration officials occur in the Fifth, Ninth and Tenth
Circuits.
21. 321 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1963).
22. In the course of routine immigration questioning, one of the officers detected the odor of marijuana apparently coming from the hood of the vehicle,
whereupon a thorough search was conducted that disclosed marijuana and other
narcotics.
23. The Act, supra note 5; the Regulation, supra note 6.
24. 321 F.2d at 285.
25. 321 F.2d at 286. The court considered the large volume of illegal alien
traffic on the road in question, the minimum safety hazards posed to motorists
by the location of the checkpoint, the limited intrusion and delay, and the 31year continuous usage of the checkpoint.
26. 321 F.2d at 287. The court did not discuss whether the search would have
been held valid based solely on the Act and the Regulation.
27. 429 F.2d 1011 (9th Cir. 1970).
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searched without probable cause,n the search was held a "part of
a routine investigation for 'illegal aliens' "and fully justified under
the Regulation.2 1 In similar cases, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits
have generally followed the Ninth."° None of the courts, however,
have sustained immigration searches when the contraband narcotics were discovered in a place or area of the vehicle wherein no alien
could possibly be concealed. 3 ' And only the Fifth Circuit has refused blanket affirmation of extended border searches by gloss of
statute. In United States v. McDaniel,2 the Fifth Circuit noted
that although the difficulty of apprehending aliens illegally entering the country necessitates some relaxation of the fourth amendment standards, the Act and the Regulation cannot render a search
for aliens immune per se to a judicial inquiry of reasonableness.
"[T]he search in question must be reasonable upon all of the
facts, only one of which is the proximity of the search to an interna28.

The vehicle was stopped at a regular checkpoint 49 miles from the border.

During the course of the search for aliens, marijuana was discovered in the trunk
in plain view.
29. 429 F.2d at 1013; see, e.g., Duprez v. United States, 435 F.2d 1276 (9th
Cir. 1970) (a warrantless search approximately 70 miles north of the border by
immigration officials is justified under 8 U.S.C. § 1357, and the designation
"border search" is neither applicable nor necessary in determining the reasonableness of the search); United States v. Miranda, 426 F.2d 283 (9th Cir. 1970)
(where immigration officers "operating out of" a permanent checkpoint stopped
and searched defendant's vehicle "not far from" the checkpoint; the marijuana
discovered under the hood during a search for aliens held admissible in evidence);
Barba-Reynes v. United States, 387 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1967) (marijuana discovered
under back seat of vehicle after odor detected during trunk search for aliens).
30. See, e.g., United States v. McCormick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Anderson, 468 F.2d 1280 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v.
DeLeon, 462 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1972).
31. See, e.g., Roa-Rodriguez v. United States, 410 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1969)
(marijuana discovered in the pocket of defendant's jacket which was in the trunk
of the vehicle); United States v. Winer, 294 F. Supp. 731 (D.C. Tex. 1969) (under
the front seat of a small foreign car); United States v. Hortze, 179 F. Supp. 913
(D.C. Cal. 1959) (in a cigarette package on the floor of the vehicle).
32. 463 F.2d 129 (5th Cir. 1972). Immigration officers stopped McDaniel at a
permanent checkpoint eight miles from the border. After routine questioning, the
officers requested that he open the trunk, as they had requested each driver who
had passed during the night in question. Within the trunk were several large
burlap bags covered with Mexican newspapers which the seemingly nervous defendant claimed contained alfalfa, but which a search revealed to be marijuana.
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tional border. ' 33 After examining all the facts, the court sustained
the conviction. 34
In the instant case, Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for a plurality
of the Court, first surveyed the common exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Noting that an auto search under Carroll requires
probable cause and an administrative search without consent
under Camara, a warrant, Stewart observed that the instant
search "embodied precisely the evil [the unfettered discretion of
the official involved] the Court saw in Camara when it insisted
that the 'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by
obtaining a warrant prior to the inspection." 35 Stewart
distinguished Colonade and Biswel136 from the instant case since

in the former, government inspections of pervasively regulated
businesses constitute only a limited intrusion on the businessman's expectation of privacy whereas the petitioner here had assumed no limitations to his privacy. Furthermore, immigration
officers do not share the government inspector's certainty that the
premises searched are engaged in the regulated activity, thereby
increasing the possibility of unwarranted intrusions upon the privacy of innocent citizens. 3 Turning to the statute, Stewart recognized the governmental power to exclude aliens and to do so by
''routine inspections or searches" at the border or a functional
equivalent thereof.3 8 Finding that the search occurred neither on
the border nor its functional equivalent, and without consent or
probable cause, the majority held that the "search violated peti33. 463 F.2d at 133.
34. Among the "facts" considered were: (1) the proximity of the checkpoint
to the border and the ease and frequency with which aliens were entering the
country in that area; (2) the early morning hours during which the checkpoint
was in operation and the consequential minimal intrusion and inconvenience
caused innocent citizens; (3) the nervousness of the defendant in addition to the
statutory authority to search; and (4) the totality of all the circumstances leading
to a "reasonable suspicion" that the bags contained contraband thereby allowing
the immigration officers to "shift" hats and search the bags as customs inspectors. 463 F.2d at 133-34.
35. 413 U.S. at 270.
36. Supra, note 13.
37. 413 U.S. at 272.
38. The Court theorized that "functional equivalent" might mean either an
established checkpoint at the "confluence of two or more roads that extend from
the border" or an interior, international airport. 413 U.S. at 273.
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tioner's right to be free of 'unreasonable searches and seizures.' "31
Concurring in the result, Mr. Justice Powell relied heavily on
Camara and concluded that area warrants based on an equivalent
of probable cause could be used to support roving patrol immigration searches in border areas. Powell noted that, as with administrative searches in Camara, roving patrol searches could be justified on their long history of judicial and public acceptance, the
lack of effective, alternative methods and the limited invasion of
the individual's privacy occasioned by administrative searches not
specifically performed to discover evidence of a criminal nature."
Powell emphasized that an area warrant would remove the immigration officer's "unfettered discretion" and place it in the hands
of the disinterested judiciary.' Mr. Justice White, writing for the
dissent, found the search reasonable on the exigent circumstances
and the express grant of congressional authority as evidenced by
the Act and the Regulation. 2
The question left unanswered by the opinion in the instant case
is its ultimate effect on the detection of aliens illegally within the
country. Section 287(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
and the Attorney General's regulation, 8 C.F.R. § 287.1, were not
expressly ruled unconstitutional and apparently survived, even
though greatly impaired by the Court's decision. Read most narrowly, the opinion would seem to render the Act and Regulation
unconstitutional as applied to virtually all roving patrol searches.
In United States v. Byrd,43 a Fifth Circuit decision involving almost identical circumstances and decided since the instant case,
39. 413 U.S. at 273.
40. In its brief to the Court, the Government, in support of its analogy to
administrative searches, asserted that only 3% of those aliens discovered were
criminally prosecuted. 413 U.S. at 278.
41. In addition, Justice Powell outlined what he considered to be factors relevant to a determination of probable cause for the issuance of an area warrant:
(1) the frequency with which aliens are illegally transported in a given area; (2)
the proximity of the area to the border; (3) extent of travel in and geographic
characteristics of the area to be searched; and (4) the probable degree of interference with the rights of innocent persons, considering the scope of the search, its
duration and the concentration of alien traffic in relation to the general traffic of
the road or area. 413 U.S. at 283-84.

42. 413 U.S. at 285-99.
43. 483 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1973) (roving patrol stopped defendant 45 miles
north of the border, and while leaning through a rear window to search for aliens,
the officer smelled marijuana which he subsequently discovered in the trunk).
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the court said that the first question is whether or not the search
was a "border search" as defined by the Court in Almeida-Sanchez
(at the border or its functional equivalent); if not, the fourth
amendment guarantees apply. The Fifth Circuit ruled the search
invalid.44 Read only slightly more broadly, the Court's opinion
could be construed to proscribe all warrantless searches conducted
without probable cause or a warrant unless they occur at the border or its functional equivalent. This reading would seem to undermine the validity of searches conducted at many of the long established, permanent checkpoints." With some reluctance; the Tenth
Circuit agrees. In United States v. King,4" a case involving a search
at a permanent checkpoint 98 miles from the border, that court
remarked that 8 C.F.R. § 287.1 represents an administrative determination of reasonableness authorized by Congress. Neverthe.less, constrained to follow Almeida-Sanchez, the Tenth Circuit
held that the search is reasonable only if the checkpoint is functionally equivalent to the border and remanded the case for a
determination thereof. In view of the unanswered questions, the
most likely effect of the opinion will be the implementation of area
warrants for immigration searches, the solution so strongly suggested by Justice Powell. Considering all the factors involved in
the prevention of illegal entry by aliens, such procedure falls easily
within the Camara rationale, and the present Court would apparently so find.4" Most importantly, area warrants will allow the
Immigration Service the needed flexibility to cope (in some measure) with the virtually insoluble problem of illegal immigration,
yet retain in the judiciary the power of watchful scrutiny to ensure
that all intrusions into the fourth amendment rights of the people
in border areas are well considered and, above all, reasonable.
G. Cranwell Montgomery
44. 483 F.2d at 1201.
45. For example, the Immigration Service maintains a permanent checkpoint
on Interstate 5 north of Oceanside, California, approximately 66 miles north of
the border. It is not near the border, nor is it at a confluence of roads leading
directly from the border, and there are a number of towns, including San Diego,
between the border and the checkpoint. Its location, therefore, would not seem
to fit within the Court's definition of "functional equivalent."
46. 485 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1973).
47. In the instant case, Justice Stewart noted that the four justices joining in
the majority opinion were split on the issue; Justice Powell recommended it; and
the remaining four justices, though believing it unnecessary, endorsed it. 413 U.S.
at 270 n.3, 279-85, 288.
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JURISDICTION-SECURITIEs EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934-SECTION
10(b) APPLIES TO FRAUDULENT TRANSACTION IN UNLISTED FOREIGN
SECURITIES WHEN THE ONLY CONDUCT WITHIN THE UNITED STATES IS
THE USE OF THE MAILS AND THE TELEPHONE

Plaintiffs, an American citizen and a trust company,' sued defendants, Canadian citizens and corporations,2 under section
10(b) 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) and Rule
10b-5,1 for damages arising from the proposed merger of defendant
Anthes Imperial Limited (Anthes) into defendant Molson Industries Limited (Molson). The complaint alleged that defendants'
misrepresentations caused plaintiffs, shareholders of Anthes, to
incur a substantial loss on the sale of their stock to the tender
offeror, Molson.5 Moving to dismiss the complaint, defendants
argued that they never entered the United States and that their
only contact with plaintiffs was through the telephone and the
mails; therefore the alleged violation occurred outside the country
1. Plaintiffs were Glen J. Travis of St. Louis, Missouri, and the St. Louis
Union Trust Company, a Missouri corporation with its principal place of business
in Missouri. The St. Louis Trust Company was the trustee of a Travis family
trust.
2. The corporate defendants were Anthes Imperial Limited (Anthes), Molson
Industries Limited (Molson), and Dominion Securities Limited (Dominion).
Dominion was the broker handling the merger of Anthes into Molson. The stock
of these corporations was not registered with the Securities Exchange Commission
or listed on any American national stock exchange, but each corporation owns
subsidiaries and conducts business in the United States.
The 23 individual defendants were controlling shareholders, officers and/or
directors of Anthes and/or Molson.
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970).
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. The 1934 Act is not self-executing. Rule 10b-5 was
enacted to implement § 10(b). "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or
of the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (1) to employ
any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (2) to make any untrue statement of a
material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security." 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (as amended 1951).
5. Plaintiffs alleged that when the tender offer was made, defendants led
plaintiffs to believe that if they retained their stock until after the expiration of
the tender offer to Canadian shareholders, a separate offer would be made to
them, which would provide an after tax result to the Americans equivalent to that
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and the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.' The district
court agreed and dismissed the complaint. 7 On appeal to the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, held, reversed and remanded.
When American shareholders of unlisted Canadian stock are
fraudulently induced by Canadian buyers to sell, the buyers' use
of the mails and the telephone is conduct within the United States
sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the district court
under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Travis v. Anthes Imperial
Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 1973).
When a case has substantial transnational aspects, one significant consideration for a court is whether United States law applies
to the particular case. 8 The general rule, stated in 1909 in
received by the Canadian shareholders. No such offer was ever made to plaintiffs
and they sold their shares for substantially less than they would have received
had they sold them when they first learned of the tender offer. The plaintiffs also
alleged that their exclusion from the merger constituted self-dealing because it
resulted in.increased voting control, improved dividends and higher salaries and
benefits for the individual defendants. 473 F.2d at 519.
6. Defendants also sought dismissal on the grounds of (1) lack of personal
jurisdiction, (2) insufficiency of service of process, and (3) failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. The trial court did not consider these contentions. The first of these was fully briefed and argued in the instant case; the latter
two were not. 473 F.2d at 520.
7. Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Mo. 1971).
8. Another significant consideration is whether the law should be applied to
the particular case, however, in applying the 1934 Act this question has been bypassed. Indeed, Professor Ehrenzweig suggests that in fraud cases the forum state

will always apply its own law. A.

EHRENZWEIG,

A

TREATISE ON THE CONFLICTS OF

558-59 (1962). Whether the law should be applied is a policy problem, which
entails evaluating the interests and deciding whether American interests are more
substantial than those of other nations. In this way, the courts can refuse to hear
cases that would conflict with the interests of another nation and are not important to the United States. When there are competing national interests the court
should balance the interests and assume jurisdiction only if the American interests are more substantial than any others. See discussion of Lauritzen and
Hellenic infra, notes 32-36 and accompanying text. See, Note, Extraterritorial
Application of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 342, 352-53 (1973)
(hereinafter cited as ExtraterritorialApplication); Trautman, The Role of Conflicts Thinking in Determining the InternationalReach of American Regulatory
Legislation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 586, 611-627 (1961) (hereinafter cited as Trautman).
For discussion in a related area see Haight, InternationalLaw and Extraterritorial
Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.J. 639 (1954), and Note,
ExtraterritorialApplication of the Antitrust Laws, 69 HARv. L. REv. 1452, 145362 (1956).
LAW
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American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,' is that federal legislation is presumed to apply only within the territorial limits of the
United States. In American Banana, the Court found that the
Sherman Antitrust Act could not be applied in an action between
two American corporations in which the plaintiff did not allege
that defendant's activities had a substantial effect with the country.' " When the defendant is a foreign national, however, the territorial presumption limits jurisdiction to acts that occur within the
United States. An alleged wrongful act committed outside the
country is beyond the jurisdiction of the courts, even though the
same act committed within the country is unlawful. Consequently,
as international trade increased during the twentieth century, the
territorial presumption caused harsh results in many transactions."' In 1945, the Second Circuit, responding to this difficult
situation, 2 decided in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America,'3 that when a defendant's foreign activities have an allegedly substantial effect within the United States, the court has
subject matter jurisdiction. In Alcoa, the government alleged that
the effect of the defendant Canadian corporation's foreign activities was restraining trade within the United States and, therefore,
was violative of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Finding for the government, the court reasoned that the location of the wrongful act itself
should not prevent the exercise of jurisdiction when there was a
wrongful effect within the United States. 4 The Court in Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co., Inc. 15 followed this interpretation, finding defendant's foreign manufacturing activities violative of the Lanham
Act"6 because the plaintiff's trade reputation was adversely affected by the entrance of defendant's products into the United
9. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
10. 213 U.S. at 359. The American Banana Company alleged that the United
Fruit Company had instigated the government of Costa Rica to seize the Banana
Company's plantation, resulting in injury to plaintiff's plantation, supplies and
railway.
11. ExtraterritorialApplication, supra note 8, at 342.
12. For a discussion of the major cases in the extraterritorial application of
§ 10(b) of the 1934 Act see ExtraterritorialApplication, supra note 8.
13. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
14. 148 F.2d at 443.
15. 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
16. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1970) (statute protecting registered trademarks).
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States.' 7 When construing section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, however,
the courts initially applied the territorial presumption in addition
to the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 10b-5 1 8-that the defendant utilize either a means of interstate commerce, the mails, or
the facilities of a national securities exchange. Consequently,
American investors defrauded in international transactions were
protected only if a "necessary and substantial act" 9 of the alleged
fraud occurred within the United States. At the time the Second
Circuit decided Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,2" the claims of defrauded investors depended upon the location of the elements of
the prohibited act, a situation similar to Alcoa. The court found
that when foreign transactions have an allegedly harmful effect on
American investors, the restrictive territorial presumption should
not be applied and, therefore, jurisdiction should attach. In
Schoenbaum, an American shareholder of a Canadian corporation
listed on the American Stock Exchange sued Canadian defendants
alleging violation of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5.
The court reasoned that since section 10(b) embodies the national
public interest of protecting American investors from fraudulent
schemes, the alleged harm to plaintiff and the threat to the vitality
of the national stock exchange constituted an effect within the
United States sufficient to warrant jurisdiction, even though all of
the alleged wrongful acts occurred in Canada.2 1 Clearly, the deci17. 344 U.S. at 286-88. Defendant was an American manufacturer assembling
products in Mexico. Although no Mexican laws were violated, the goods exported
to the United States infringed plaintiff's trademark. See, Strassheim v. Daily, 221
U.S. 280 (1911) (acts outside Michigan held sufficient to confer jurisdiction when
effect is within Michigan).
18. Supra note 4.
19. Ferraioli v. Cantor, 259 F. Supp. 842, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (location of
corporate executive offices in New York City constitutes substantial nexus); Kook
v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (registration of firm under 1934
Act and incidental use of telephone and mails not necessary and substantial). But
see S.E.C. v. Gulf Int'l Fin. Corp., 223 F. Supp. 987, 994 (S.D. Fla. 1963) (use of
newspaper advertisements substantial).
20. 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
21. 405 F.2d at 206-09. The court relied on § 18 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

LAW OF THE UNITED

STATES

(hereinafter cited as

"[Section] 18 Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Effect
within Territory: A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal
consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either (a) the conduct and its effect are generally recognized
RESTATEMENT).
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sion stated that the extraterritorial application of the 1934 Act to
those transactions that involve stock listed on a national exchange
is proper, but the full effect of the case on the territorial presumption was unclear. As a minimum the court recognized that the
presumption was satisfied by the stock listing on a national security exchange, a significant departure from the strict rule of
American Banana. On the other hand, it was possible that the
court had discarded the presumption entirely and viewed the listing as simply meeting the "national security exchange" requirement 22 of Rule 10b-5. This uncertainty was resolved in Leasco Data
24
ProcessingEquip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 23 in which the operative facts
were essentially the same as in Schoenbaum, except that the stock
was not listed on a national exchange. The court found that the
meetings between the parties, an essential link in the alleged
fraudulent transaction, was conduct within the United States sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the district court. 25 Since the territorial contacts in Leasco were less than in Schoenbaum, the decision indicated the declining importance of the territorial presumpas constitutent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have
reasonably developed legal systems, or (b)(i) the conduct and its effect are
constitutent elements of activity to which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within
the territory is substantial; (iii) it occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the
conduct outside the territory; and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal
systems." RESTATEMENT § 18 (1965). For a discussion of the "effects" doctrine as
applied to securities regulation see Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 95-99 (1969); Becker,
ExtraterritorialDimensions of the Securities Exchange Act, 2 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L.
& POL. 233, 235-39 (1969); see, Trautman, supra, note 8, at 609; Note, Offshore
Mutual Funds: Possible Solutions to a Regulatory Dilemma, 3 LAW & POL. INT'L
Bus. 157, 186-87 (1971).
22. Supra note 4.
23. 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972). For a discussion of Leasco and the law see 6
VAND.

J. TRANSNAT'L L. 687 (1973).

24. Plaintiff was an American investor owning stock in a British corporation
not listed on a national stock exchange; all defendants were British; and part of
the negotiations for the alleged fraudulent transaction were held in New York City
and Long Island.
25. 468 F.2d at 1336-37. The court relied on § 17 of the RESTATEMENT. "Jurisdiction to Prescribe with Respect to Conduct, Thing, Status, or Other Interest
within Territory. A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law (a) attaching
legal consequences to conduct that occurs within its territory, whether or not such
consequences are determined by the effects of the conduct outside the territory,
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tion; however both Schoenbaum and Leasco, revealing a reluctance to abandon the territorial presumption outright, 2 found either an effect or conduct within the United States in addition to
the harm to the American investor and the jurisdictional requirements of Rule 10b-5.
In the instant case, the court found both an effect and conduct
within the United States sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the
district court. 27 Noting that defendants' alleged self-dealing and
and (b) relating to a thing located, or a status or other interest localized, in its
territory." RESTATEMENT § 17 (1965). The second illustration applies directly to
Leasco. "X and Y are in state A. X makes a misrepresentation to Y. X and Y go
to state B. Solely because of the prior misrepresentation, Y delivers money to X.
A has jurisdiction . . . ." Id.
26. Neither Schoenbaum nor Leasco considered whether jurisdiction should
have been exercised in view of competing national interests and policy, although
there was no reason to consider the interests of other forums after assuming
jurisdiction. It must be noted, however, that courts often recognize such interests
when rendering decisions. For example, if a foreign jurisdiction has taken a contrary position on the same issue, the courts may limit opinions to exclude that
forum. Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956) (use
in Canada of valid Canadian trademark not reviewable); United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio 1954) (Holophane not allowed to infringe
valid foreign patent and trademark rights in foreign states). For a comparison of
these two cases see Note, ExtraterritorialApplication of United States Legislation
Against Restrictive or Unfair Trade Practices,51 Am.J. INT'L L. 380 (1957). When
it is likely that another jurisdiction might make a contrary decision on the same
problem, the courts may include a "savings clause" in the opinion that allows
noncompliance in conflicting states. United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., 105
F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). The limitations on the exercise of enforcement
jurisdiction is discussed in RESTATEMENT § 40: "Limitations on Exercise of Enforcement Jurisdiction. Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct
upon the part of a person, each state is required by international law to consider,
in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement jurisdiction, in the light
of such factors as (a) vital national interests of each of the states, (b) the extent
and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose upon the person, (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place
in the territory of the other state, (d) the nationality of the person, and (e) the
extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected
to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state." RESTATEMENT § 40
(1965). For a discussion of international law in the federal courts see Note,
Limitationson the FederalJudicialPower to Compel Acts Violating ForeignLaw,
63 COLUM. L. REV. 1441, 1482-94 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Limitations on the
Federal JudicialPower].
27. The court adopted both §§ 18 (effects) and 17 (conduct) of the
RESTATEMENT, supra notes 21 and 25 respectively.
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plaintiff's monetary loss were constituent elements of activity to
which section 10(b) of the 1934 Act applies, the court, relying upon
Leasco, reasoned that jurisdiction would attach if there was significant conduct with respect to the alleged violations within the
United States. The court also reasoned, relying on Schoenbaum,
that when conduct outside the United States has a substantial
effect within the country, jurisdiction could be exercised. The
court first found that defendants' use of the mails and telephone
in the United States was an essential link in the alleged fraudulent
transaction and, therefore, jurisdiction attachs; the court also
found that jurisdiction attachs because the diminished value of
plaintiff's stock and the lesser dividends received by other American shareholders constituted a substantial effect' 8 within the
United States.2 9
The instant case is the final step in the extraterritorial application of section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5. Although both
Schoenbaum and Leasco weakened the territorial presumption
when applying the 1934 Act, both cases required an effect or conduct within the United States in addition to the requirements of
Rule 10b-5 that an American investor be harmed and that the
transaction utilize either a national securities exchange, a means
of interstate commerce, or the mails. The instant case, however,
did not require an additional effect or conduct, as the court based
jurisdiction on an allegation of harm to an American investor and
the use of the mails and telephone. The territorial presumption
was discarded and was not used to restrict the extraterritorial application of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Although the instant
case appears sound because of the national public interest involved, the decision may cause future courts difficulty in cases in
which American interests are minor. Courts will have to distinguish the instant case on its facts, and the rule of law that evolves
28. The court notes that even if all the fraudulent dealings took place in
Canada, the 1934 Act would apply. In the instant case the alleged fraud was
actually perpetrated through the telephone and mails. 473 F.2d at 527-28.
29. The court exercised personal jurisdiction over those defendants who acted
within the district or caused foreseeable consequences therein. The court indicated that on the basis of the record there was personal jurisdiction over three of
the individual defendants and over Anthes and Molson, and directed the district
court to resolve the question as to the remaining defendants on remand after
giving the plaintiffs an opportunity for discovery. 473 F.2d 530.
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will be riddled with exceptions. For example, if an American shareholder in St. Louis receives an innocent telephone call from a
foreign buyer in Mexico, which starts a chain of events leading to
a fraudulent purchase outside the United States, under the instant
case, the call could probably be construed as an essential link in
the fraudulent transaction and could constitute conduct sufficient
for the exercise of jurisdiction. Furthermore, in the above example,
if the American investor is visiting Canada and the telephone conversation to Mexico goes in part over cables in the United States,
under the instant case, this would also seem to be sufficient conduct. In each situation above the interests of the United States are
questionable, yet the case at bar indicates that the federal courts
should assume jurisdiction. 0 Since considerations of national interest might indicate that jurisdiction should not be exercised, the
instant court should have evaluated the applicability of the 1934
Act, rather than automatically applying section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 after deciding that the statute was applicable. A better approach would determine first, whether the 1934 Act applies, and
secondly, whether it should be applied in view of national interest
and policy, assuming jurisdiction only upon a satisfactory answer
to both questions.3 1 When there are competing national interests
in a case, the Court may balance the interests to determine
whether to exercise jurisdiction. In Lauritzen v. Larsen,3 after
deciding that the alleged wrongful act was within the ambit of the
Jones Act,3 3 the Court then balanced the interests, considering the
nationalities of the parties, the place of the wrongful act, the place
of the contract, the law of the forum and the accessibility of a
foreign forum.3 4 The Court found that foreign interests outweighed
30. The instant court suggests these results by noting that even if the fraudulent acts occurred entirely in Canada, defendants would be liable, supra note 28.
31. See discussion supra note 8.
32. 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (Danish seaman sought recovery in New York City for
injuries caused by a fellow seaman on a Danish ship in Havana).
33. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (statute providing a cause of action for injured seaman).
The court usually applies the balancing test when there is a question of assuming
jurisdiction under the Jones Act.
34. This list is not exclusive; for instance, defendant's base of business operations may be important, as well as other factors. Pavlou v. Ocean Traders Marine
Corp., 211 F. Supp. 320, 325 (1962). Section 6 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS suggests similar considerations: "(a) the needs of the interstate and
international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c)the relevant
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those of the United States, and, therefore, would not assume jurisdiction.3 5 Using the balancing test, when the interests of the United
States are more substantial than any other forum, or one of the
American interests is so significant as to be substantial in itself,
the court assumes jurisdiction. 3 The balancing test organizes the
law according to the weight of the various competing factors and
would be particularly appropriate for cases under section 10(b)
because, like the Jones Act, the 1934 Act is a public statute that
creates private rights and a private cause of action. The similar
nature of the statutes indicates that the balancing test used in
Jones Act cases would also be appropriate in actions under the
1934 Act.37 In the instant case, for example, a court would probably
find that (1) the United States has a vital national interest in
protecting her investors from deceptive schemes; (2) although the
plaintiffs are American and defendants are not, they had assets in
the United States; (3) custom permits the exercise of jurisdiction
when activities threaten the financial security of the forum state38
and (4) the plaintiffs could expect fair dealing from the defendants. These findings suggest that the instant court was correct in
applying American law to the particular case, but the advantage
policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the
determination of the particular issue, (d)the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application
of the law to be applied."
35. 345 U.S. at 592.
36. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Zacharias Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 310 (1969). The
Court weighs the facts in view of the underlying objective of the statute being
applied. 398 U.S. at 309 n.4. Since § 10(b) of the 1934 Act is construed liberally
to protect American investors from fraudulent schemes, the balancing test would
evaluate the circumstances in view of that objective.
37. The balancing test has also been used in trademark cases. Vanity Fair
Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871
(1956); George W. Luft Co. v. Zande Cosmetic Co., 142 F.2d 536 (2d Cir.) cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 756 (1944); Trautman, supra note 8, at 618.
38. Custom permits the exercise of jurisdiction over (1) activities that
threaten the political or financial security of the forum state, (2) activities of
nationals absent a conflicting exercise of jurisdiction by the state in whose territory the activities occur, (3) activities universally regarded as hostile to mankind,
and (4) activities preparatory of the commission of a crime when part of the crime
occurs within the forum state. Limitations on the FederalJudicialPower, supra
note 26, at 1474.
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of the balancing method is that the law develops in a flexible
manner allowing the courts to avoid cases, such as the above hypotheticals, which do not concern a substantial national interest, and
that the instant case would then be useful in determining the
importance of various factors in future decisions.
Douglas Ian Friedman
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